University of Dayton

eCommons
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Department of Philosophy

2011

Can Luce Irigaray's Notion of Sexual Difference be
Applied to Transsexual and Transgender
Narratives?
Danielle Poe
University of Dayton, dpoe01@udayton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons
eCommons Citation
Poe, Danielle, "Can Luce Irigaray's Notion of Sexual Difference be Applied to Transsexual and Transgender Narratives?" (2011).
Philosophy Faculty Publications. Paper 13.
http://ecommons.udayton.edu/phl_fac_pub/13

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu,
mschlangen1@udayton.edu.

SIX

CAN LUCE IRIGARAY'S NOTION OF
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE BE APPLIED
TO TRANSSEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER NARRATIVES?

Danielle Poe
For over thirty years, Luce lrigaray's work on sexual difference has been
the subject of debate about whether sexual difference is essential, necessary,
oppressive, or some combination of these. I examine critiques from people
who claim that her work is based on an essentialism that is dismissive
and harmful to transsexual and transgender discourse. I argue that lrigaray's
ethics, based on sexual difference, has the potential to lead to discussions
about all difference, including differences in sexuality. lrigaray's complex
understanding of sexual difference as natural, cultural, spiritual, and morphological can help us interpret transsexual narratives, narratives by people
who seek medical intervention to attain the correct embodiment (Feinberg
l996; Prosser 1998). Transsexual and transgender narratives can also help
us to better .understand Irigaray's insistence that corporeality is indispensable
for cultivating sexual difference. However, accounts of transgender experience- people whose gender identity does not correspond to their sex and
assigned g nder identity (Feinberg 1996; Halberstam 2005 )- challenge any
conception that sexual difference can be only binary.
.
In the first part of this chapter, I focus on lrigaray's notion of sexual
di~erence and critiques from feminist philosophers who argue that lrigaray
relies on essentialism to define sexual difference. Many scholars assume that
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because lrigaray's philosophy begins with a critique of masculine discourse
in order to create a space fo r the feminine that she makes her distinction
between the masculine and the feminine based on biological differences.
These readings of lrigaray portray her as conservative and sympathetic to
traditional gender stereotypes, which betrays Irigaray's continuous critique of
static understandings of sex and gender (Irigaray 1996 [1 992], 2001 [1997],
2002 [1 999)). A close read ing of !rig ray's texts revea ls that it is _a misunderstanding to think of sexual difference as simply biological or as static
cultural essentialism.
In the second section f this chapter, I discus the ways in which
misreadings of sexual difference give rise to the argument that lrigaray's
philosophy is normatively heterosexual (Butler and Cornell 1998; Murphy
2007; Bergoffen 2007). The charge that Irigaray prescribes heterosexuality
leads to the further charge that her philosophy is dismissive of transsexual
and transgender peop le. In particular, I focus on the work of Ann Murphy,
a recent critic of lrigaray's proj ect. Murphy argues that lrigaray's notion
of sexual difference forces women and men to identify with their gender
and with conservative social norms, which harms those individuals whose
sexuality challenges traditional norms.
I argue that Murphy's critique of lrigaray hinges on misreadings of
the relation between "nature" and "the natural," a distinction that lrigaray
maintains in her work. According to Murphy, "nature" and "the natural" are
one and the same for lrigaray, and woman's nature is that which spontaneously arises for women (Murphy 2007, 80-84). However, lrigaray develops
her notion of "woman's nature" as a "cultivated natural" (lrigaray 2002
[1999]). The "cultivated natural" is the way in which woman develops h er
nature both in relation to culture and her materi al circum ·ranees, in luding
biology, psychology, and morphology. Thus, Irigaray doe.s not advocate that
women shou ld simply embrace the "nature" imposed on them by society
or biology. She promotes a position in which woman creates her nature in
keeping with the many parts that cause her to call herself "woman."
Finally, I use lrigaray's notion of sexual difference to show that whereas
critics are right to point out that lrigaray does not adequately develop what
sexual difference means for transsexual and transgender people, her reader '
can use lrigaray's work to engage transsexual and transgender narratives.
lrigaray's emphas is on the heterosexual relationship points to the deep difficulty of those relationships. Nonheterosexual relationships already challenge patriarchal structures in a way that helps to distinguish and support
the limits of sexual difference. lrigaray's development of sexual difference is
not a proj ect that intends merely to preserve sexual difference, but moves
from systems of oppress ion to ethical ways of interacting. To show how
lrigaray's philosophy is applicable to transsexual people, I examine the nar-
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ratives of gender crossing from Deirdre McCloskey and Max Wolf Valerio
(McCloskey 1999; Treut et al. 1992). I then discuss the limits of lrigaray's
analysis by considering descriptions of transgender experience as related by
Judith Halberstam and Leslie Feinberg (Halberstam 2005; Feinberg 1996).
TH E ES E NT IA LI M / ANTl - ES E.NT IALL SM D EBAT E

In the 1980s many feminists critiqued lrigaray's project of articu lating sexual
difference because they were concerned that sexual difference could only
be established by seeking out an essential feature that was common to all
women and excluded all nonwomen . This feature wa thought t be an
unchanging biological essence that would enforce a single lifesty le on all
women. These feminists instead wanted to free women from burdensome
stereotypes by arguing that there are no essential differences between men
and women; we are all simply human. Irigaray and others argued that establishing a fundamental difference between men and women does not require
discovering an essential feat~re common to all women. Instead, it requires
a complex articulation of difference that is always present and the ground
for other kinds of difference.
The debate over lrigaray's supposed essentialism continues. I believe
that what is commonly understood as a biological essentialism in lrigaray's
work is a misreading, and lrigaray is not an essentialist. What is at stake
in the debate about essentialism is whether fem inists should work to erase
sexual difference or work to establish sexual difference. Those who critique
lrigaray's alleged essentialism argue that gender is socially imposed and can
be overcome in favor of common humanity in which many differences can
flourish (Butler and ornell 1998; Butler 1990, 1993 ). Those who advocate
establishing sexual difference argue that the attempt t overcome it results
in men dominating women (Irigaray 1985 [1 974], 1993 [1 984], 1996 [1992],
2002 (1999]). Defenders of Irigaray maintain that she observes factual difference based in cu lture and history and not the effects of a biological
reductionism.
The charge that lrigaray is an essentialist originates in her insistence
that sexual difference is unavo idable, contributes to full human flourishing,
and has the potential to transform re lationships between men and women,
which in turn could transform the law, the market, and the environment.
The argument that lrigaray relies on biological essentialism for her notion
of sexual difference seems to come from her analysis of women's bodies. To
understand why she focuses so heavily on women's bodies, it is important
to remember that lrigaray's ethical, philosophical, and political roots all
begin in an understanding of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis brings with it
an attention to the body that pervades lrigaray's work.
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As early as Speculum of the Other Woman, lrigaray turns her attention
to an analysis of women's bodies (1985 [1974]). In "Irigaray's Body Symbolic," Margaret Whitford draws our attention to the importance of the lips
and mucous as a metaphor in lrigaray's work that can provide a model 0£
divinity, sexuality, and speech that are proper to establishing sexual difference. For Whitford, lrigaray's focus on lips and mucous provides a means of
thinking about ethics as relational instead of hierarchical. In this model for
ethics, the sensible is emphasized such that ethics relates to the here and
now rather than to a static, universal definition. As something that is more
accessible to touch than sight, mucous can only be accessed in the sensible.
Mucous is at the threshold of the lips and signifies an openness, a refusal to
close women into some fixed definition defined by patriarchy. Whitford also
argues that mucous corresponds to women's sexuality and women's speech.
Mucous can never be reduced to a part, or an object; therefore, mucous is
not easily incorporated in the masculine imaginary. Mucous is not part of"
a binary opposition; it touches and flows between that which it touches
(Whitford 1991).
If we take Whitford's analysis further, we notice that Irigaray's discussion of mucous and its importance never occurs separately from her discussion of the importance of the lips:
A remaking of immanence and transcendence, notably through this

threshol.d which has never been examined as such: the fema le sex. The
threshold that gives access to the mucous. Beyond classical oppositions
of love and hate, liquid and ice-a threshold that is always half-open.
The threshold of the lips, which are strangers to dichotomy and oppositions. Gathered one against the other but without any possible
suture, at least of a real kind. They do not absorb the world into
or through themselves, provided they are not misused and reduced
to a means of consumption or consummation. They offer a shape
of welcome but do not assimilate, reduce, or swallow up. (Irigaray
1993 [1984], 18, emphasis in original)

lrigara')' analyst- focu e cm b th the fa ia\ h\Y and th g t\ita\ hp . Tb.
reh .tion of h p to them elve i on e in which the touching-touched telati.on_
cannot be distinguished. The lips are both touched and touching.
W hile some might argue that lrigaray's attention to women's lips is
feature of essentialism in which a woman is a woman based on her genitalia, we can instead understand her focus on the lips as a rejoinder to Freud
and Lacan's insistence that woman is an absence, absence of the penis and
absence of the phallus. The lips are material and different than the penis.
Yet, the lips are not a static category; the lips function differently in differ-
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ent circumstances. lrigaray emphasizes that lips both welcome and limit our
relationships. For Irigaray, ethics is not simply about what one is permitted to
do, but also how one is limited by the other (Irigaray 2001 [1997], 33-37).
In welcoming and limiting the other, the ethical model demands first of all
that a woman can speak for herself. For Irigaray, a woman speaks for herself
by virtue of situating herself in relation to her sex and to the limit of her
sex. She says, in fact, I am created by two genders and I live in a mixed
community. But let us consider a utopia of our age: a woman gives birth
to a woman, and they live in a community of women separated from the
other part of the world. A woman in such a situation should consider her
identity as woman as an identity in relationship with the other gender, at
least insofar as it is her intention to fulfill her own gender. There is in me,
woman, a part that is negative, not realizable by me alone, a part of night,
a part that is reserved, a part that is irreducibly feminine and that is not
suited to represent the whole of the human being that must enter into the
constitution of my identity (34).
Even for the woman who is born to another woman and who lives
only with other women, this woman-among-women is still characterized by
the part of her that cannot represent all of humanity. Thus, this woman
does not become woman by "not being a man" since she has never been
exposed to men. Rather, she becomes woman by recognizing her own irreducibility and her own inability to represent every human. In this case,
irreducibility has to do with her irreducibility as a single individual, who
does not represent all women and is not represented by all women. Thus,
lrigaray's claims about irreducibility include a means to preserve individuals'
concreteness in relation to the universal. But, to fulfill her relationship to
the universal, woman must consider her identity in relation to the identity
of men. Her relation to the universal does not appropriate all universality.
Woman's relationship to the universal through her gender does include
attention to anatomical difference, but sexual difference includes much
more than bodily difference. The previous passage emphasizes that although
women's bodies are important for lrigaray, sexual difference is also based on
relationships between people. Moreover, these relationships shape sexual difference, as well as being shaped by it. If lrigaray's work advocated biological
essentialism, we would expect a static, universal notion of sex, which would
shape relationships. However, lrigaray does not offer any essential characteristics of women and men. Instead, she emphas izes the necessity of cu ltivating
sexual difference in a way that would allow other differences to flourish.
Hilge Landweer argues that the concepts of sex and gender are necessarily bound to generativ ity, and all subsequent concepts derive from an
original duality, the two sexes required for generation (Landweer 2005,
29- 30). She writes,
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I claim that reproduction is indeed a topic that has to be negotiated on a social- theoretical level and that shou ld not be turned
into a taboo on grounds of a general suspicion of essentialism.
Due to the anthropologically sti ll va lid fact that humans are born
and die, generativity leads in every cu lture to categ rizations of
"gender." By generativity I mean the simple insight that human
societies (similar to many animals) depend for their reproduction
on two sexes, no matter to what extent and with which culturally
specific meaning. (31)
The claim that sexual difference is always based on generat1v1ty and two
sexes is a claim about the nature of being human. Every human society
must concern itself with reprod uction in order to continue. Accordingly,
every society applies its own rules, performances, and structure to how thi
generativity rakes place. For Landweer, essentialism is not a claim about
women's and men's biological destiny; rather, it is the common starting
point from which we can discuss and critique categories of sex and gender.
I would add that sexual difference as related to generativity begins with
each person's biological origin, but once conception has occurred, a person'
experience of sex and gender will occur in any number of situations. One
may be born to a single woman, raised by two men, may discover that one
is transsexual or transgender. Even when peop le's concrete circumstance
are not circumscribed by a heterosexual relationship, generativity inform
how our culture is structured, and sexua l difference remains foundational
and unavoidable.

CULTfVATfNG THE NATURAL
This section considers Ann Murphy's arguments that certa in passages in
lrigaray's writings reveal a dangerous trend to stifle difference. Murphy points
to passages in which lrigaray wants to limit sexual difference to inborn
differences that ought not to be questioned or changed. I argue that Murphy does indeed identify problematic passages in lrigaray's work, but we
should use Irigaray's rejection of biological essentialism to counter lrigaray's
rej ection of transsexual and transgender identification. Drawing on work
by Landweer and Alison Stone, I argue that natural differences-inborn
differences-should be cultivated to preserve se~ua l difference. Contrary
to Irigaray's own interpretation of sexual difference, I read the cultivation
of sex ual difference as inclusive of transsexual and transgender experience.
In the article "Beyond Performativity and Against 'Identification':
Gender and Technology in Irigaray," Murphy continues the essentialism
critique of Irigaray's conception of sexual difference by arguing that "[Iri-
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garay's] understanding of nature, and her attendant hesitations regarding
technology, lead in her later work to the forthright dismissal of discourses
on androgeny, the neuter, performativity and gender identification" (Murphy
2007, 77). As Murphy develops this claim, it seems that she interprets lrigaray's use of the term "nature" as a natural, essential category that women
have as distinct from men. For instance, Murphy cites the following passage
from I Love to You:
Without doubt, the most appropriate context for the universal is
sexual difference. Indeed, this content is both real and universal.
Sexual difference is an immediate natural given and it is a real and
irreducible component of the universal. The whole of human kind
is composed of women and men and of nothing else. The problem
of race is, in fact, a secondary problem . . . and the same goes for
other cultural diversities-religious, economic, and political ones.
(Irigaray 1996 [1992], 47; Murphy 2007, 80).
The question that arises from this passage is how to understand what lrigaray means by "an immediate natural given." The key to understanding
this passage is lrigaray's emphasis on the irreducibility of sexual difference.
Hence, sexual difference is natural inasmuch as it is perpetually present.
The natural is not some biologically determined quality or qualities. Sexual
difference does not manifest itself in the same way in every circumstance.
Landweer's analysis of gender as a holistic concept helps to clarify my
argument that sexual difference is not a biological essentialism. As I will
continue to argue, sexual difference is something that is perpetually present,
but its manifestations change and evolve. Landweer states,
I would like to make the previously mentioned "holistic" argument
based on the claim that the term gender refers to and is oriented
toward a time axis. Gender is empirically always connected with
memory, temporality and history, even though this involves infinite
variations and an unforeseeable scope of new meanings. None of
the mentioned concepts can be fully removed from this entire semantic field without changing the meaning of the other concepts.
(Landweer 2005, 34)
Gender and sexual difference always make reference to a host of other cu ltural and historical terms and understandings. T he interpretation and the
practice of gender and sexual difference vary widely in different times and in
different societies, yet sexual difference is always present. Sexual difference is
universal inasmuch as it is always present, regardless of other homogenizing
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influences. Racial, religious, economic, and political differences are important for understanding and cultivating difference, but we can imagine and
create circumstances in which those differences are absent. Thus, sexual
difference as universal refers to the inescapable nature of sexual diffe ren ce,
which manifests itself both in generativity and other cultural relationships.
For Murphy, though , lrigaray's conception of ex ual difference is also
problematic because of lri garay's suspicion of strategic of ident ificati n.
Indeed, Murphy cites a passage from I Love to You that seems to prov id
evidence that sexual difference reduces people to gross stereotypes and gender essentialism:
Some of our prosperous and nai"ve contemporaries, women and men,
would like to wipe out [sexual] diffe rence by resorting to mon oscxuality, to the unisex, and to what is ca lled identification: ev n
if I am bodily a man or a woman, I can identify with, and so be,
the other sex. This new opium of the people annihilates the other
in the illusion of a reduction to identity, equality, and sameness,
especially between man and woman, the ultimate anch orage of real
alterity. (lri garay 1996 [1 992), 61- 62; Mu rph y 2007, 89 )
In I art, this passage simply reinfo rces lrigaray's insistence that a mono exual
culture destroys all difference. Throughout her work, lrigaray h as rejected
strategies in which sexual differen ce is era ed since this erasure does n t
result in some higher, more human way of being, but in woman being
appropriated by man. lrigaray's concept of sexual difference emphasizes that
the constructs and choices we practice are inscribed on the physical bodies
of actual women and men. Landweer reminds us of the holistic nature of
sexual difference when she argues that ridding society of binary sexual difference means that we must rid society of all dual-sex reproductive practices;
otherwise, society maintains its connection to generativity as dependent on
binary sexual difference (Landweer 2005, 40) . The difficulty with alterna tive
reproductive practices (aside from the current scientific impossibility) is the
coercion and undermining of freedom and determination that it entails in
order to force people to abandon all of our current reproductive practices
(Landweer 2005 , 40) . Further, it is difficult to imagine, and as yet undefined by advocates, how new reproductive practices would lead to more ju t
relationships in the world .
Even if we accept the notion of sexual differen ce as inevitable, it is
difficult to defend lrigaray against the charge that she rejects identification
between the sexes, which might include a woman becoming a man or a
man becoming a woman. This passage is an example in which we can read
lrigaray against h erself because unless bodily difference is wh at decides sexual
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difference- which lrigaray rejects throughout her work- there is no reason
why someone who is bodily a man or a woman could not identify with the
other sex. A man or woman whose body disagrees with his or her sexual
identification does not threaten sexual difference, lead to monosexuality,
or to the unisex. lrigaray's insistence that "identity, equality, and sameness"
are a problem does not lead to the further conclusion that people who are
transsexual and transgencler would collapse the distinction between women
and men.
Transsexual discourse that understands sexual difference as a dualism
can be understood in the context of lrigaray's conception of the natural,
which she develops in Between East and West. I characterize the notion of
sexual difference that she develops in this text as a "cultivated natural."
That is, she emphasizes the ties that our bodies always and already have to
nature and the natural world, but she also emphasizes that those ties must
be refined and cultivated. The cultivation that she wants for the body can
be derived from her critique of "sociological culture":
[The body) is submitted to sociological rules, to rhythms fo reign
to its sensib ility, to its living perceptions: day and night, seasons,
vegetal growth . ... This means that acts of participation in light,
sounds or music, odors, touch or even in natural tastes are no longer cultivated as human qualities. The body is no longer educated
to develop its perceptions spiritually, but to detach itself from the
sensible for a more abstract, more speculative, more sociological
culture. (lrigaray 2002 [1 999), 55-56)
Notice in this passage that lrigaray does not insist that the body must
remain as one finds it. Instead, she critiques a culture in which one turns
away from the body, and she calls for a culture in which the body's sensibilities are cultivated and developed. Thus, a woman's or a man's body must
be developed in keeping with her or his sex and doing so means paying
attention to nature's rhythms, more so than culture's demands. According
to Stone, lrigaray connects sexual difference to nature to emphasize the
continuous cycling between poles of difference and humans' place in this
natural cycle. Nature functions in such a way that distinct processes function
interdependently. Stone gives respiration as an example: inhalation depends
on exhalation, although, they are distinct processes. Men and women are
the complete realization of this duality because they cultivate their duality
through culture (Stone 2003, 63-65).
Ultimately, the sexual difference is about cultivating the negative and
the positive, difference and relationship. lrigaray devotes much space in her
work to develop ing her understanding of the negative, which has an integral
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place in articulating sexual difference. On the one hand, she differentiates
her understanding of the negative from its traditional place in philosophy.
In the prologue of I Love to You, she states,
What I knew of the negative was the practice and the effects of
moderation, measuredness, renunciation, a certain cultivation of
personal sensibility, but it lacked any real return either in myself
or for myself. As for an absolute in-itself or for-itse lf, I could see
their limitations only too well to believe in them and desire them.
(Irigaray 1996 [1992], 13)
In this description, Irigaray stresses the role between the negative and the
positive, or the irreducible difference and the relationship. A negative thar
simply limits one's actions cannot provide a ground for new relationships
between persons. When the negative is defined as irreducible difference, it
makes way for relationships between people. Traditionally, the negative has
been used to say that woman is not man, which deprives woman of any
position. The negative in its traditional sense is not itself merely historical.
That the negative gets ascribed to women is historical; the negative gets
ascribed to women by men. When this kind of negativity is ascribed to
women, negativity is controllable, locatable.
For Irigaray, the negative is the limit that applies to every person
by virtue of sexual difference. That is, one's experience can never be universalized because it is always limited by reference to a single gender. By
limiting one's knowledge in a way that can never be overcome, Irigaray
finds a ground for new relationships between men and women. Irigaray
stresses the role between the negative and the positive, or the irreducible
difference and the relationship. A negative that simply limits one's actions
cannot provide a ground for new relationships between persons. When the
negative is defined as irreducible difference, it makes way for relationship
between people ( 13 ). Irigaray writes the following about her transformed
understanding of the negative:
The meeting at San Donato led me to discover that the negative can
mean access to the other of sexual difference and thereby become
happiness without being annihilating in the process. Hegel knew
nothing of a negative like that. His negative is still the mastery of
consciousness (historically male) over nature and humankind. The
negative in sexual difference means an acceptance of the limits of
my gender and recognition of the irreducibility of the other. It cannot be overcome, but it gives a positive access-neither instinctual
nor drive-related-to the other. (13)
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lrigaray rejects the negative in Hegel's texts because it is a "mastery of
consciousness." This rejection, however, does not eliminate the negative's
place in a dialectic of sexual difference. Sexual difference transforms the
role of the negative by recognizing its place in our relationships with the
other. The negative makes room for the irreducibility of the other. Even
as we come together in positive work for alleviating suffering, exploitation,
and violence, the negative guarantees my recognition that the other is more
than I can ever encounter or conceive.
The role of the negative also functions between women-among-themselves and men-among-themselves by guaranteeing their singular identity.
Woman and man must relate not only to each other, but to others like them.
By relating to others like them, woman comes to understand her concrete
singularity, which is irreplaceable by any other woman.
Thus, the first part of Irigaray's philosophical project begins with an
emphasis on finding the inconsistencies, gaps, and irrationality of philosophy
that focuses on a singular vision of what it means to be human. In particular,
she focuses on the ways in which a "feminine" consciousness is hidden by
a masculine process. In the later part of her philosophical project, Irigaray
describes the ways in which men and women might find ways of having
relationships that respect irreducible difference. Irigaray's work points to the
need to take seriously the concerns expressed by essentialist feminists and
antiessentialist feminists, but also we must move beyond these reductive
categories to move to the real work of transformation.

IRIGARAY AND TRANS PEOPLE
As I have argued throughout this chapter, Irigaray's notion of sexual difference does not rely on any static conception of fem ininity or masculinity.
Instead, sexual difference is a dynamic process in which men and women
cultivate their identities as men and women. Moreover, I have used Irigaray's
theoretical articulation of sexual difference to illustrate that although she
is quite critical of feminist strategies that insists that genders are the same,
equal, or interchangeable, she does not draw the further conclusion that no
one is transsexual or transgender.
Many authors have used Irigaray's work to critique normative heterosexuality (Hope 1994; Schutte 1997; Ferguson 2004). Ofelia Schutte argues
that Irigaray's disruption of symbolic structures moves society incrementally
away from normative heterosexuality by emphasizing the phenomenology
of touching and parting (Schutte 1997, 53). Schutte's argument emphasizes the power of touching to disrupt the symbolic power of penetration.
Also, Schutte's emphasis on parting should remind us of the distance that
the negative creates; both parting and distance create space for women
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to develop apart from heterosexual relationships. Ann Ferguson applauds
Schutte's critique of Irigaray and furthers that critique by citing numerous
authors whom Schutte fails to mention in her critique of lrigaray (Ferguson
2004, 173- 74 ). Trevor Hope, on the other hand, argues th.at Irigaray offers
a compelling critique of normative heterosexuality but is not adequately
attentive to the regulatory strength of homophobia (Hope 1994, 174-75).
Irigaray's work can move us even further than providing a critique of
normative heterosexuality. Her theory can be used to provide a theoretical groundwork for interpreting the narratives of transsexual people who
describe their experience of crossing genders as visibly becoming the people
that they always knew themselves to be. In Transgender Warriors, Leslie
Feinberg defines transsexual people as those who "traverse the boundary
of the sex they were assigned at birth" (Feinberg 1996, x). For the transsexual man or woman, surgical intervention allows him or her to cross a
sexual boundary and to embody the proper sex (Prosser 1998, 69, 83). If we
consider some of the literature on crossing from male to female or female
to male, Irigaray's point, that sexual difference is an irreducible difference,
clarifies why crossing sex boundaries is important for transsexuals.
Consider the book Crossing: A Memoir, by Deirdre N. McCloskey,
in which the author details her transition from being a man to being a
woman. McCloskey states, "My gender crossing was motivated by identity,
not by a balance sheet of utility" (McCloskey 1999, xiii). McCloskey did not
become a woman simply because she thought that women are happier, nicer,
or prettier, nor did she cross because she thought that women have easier
lives. Rather, she argues that she changed her physical identity to match
her psychological and spiritual identity. In McCloskey's case, it would seem
that the body with which she was born was an unreliable way of establishing sexual difference. For McCloskey, her sexual identity is established by
her mind, emotions, and spiritual beliefs. Only after she fully crossed did
her body become consonant with her identity.
For lrigaray, the body is working with the mind, emotions, and spiritual beliefs to define sexual identity and to establish sexual difference, but
McCloskey's experience challenges us to refine our understanding of sexual identity and difference. In this case, sexual identity is still established
through sexual difference because McCloskey knew he was not like other
men. Through crossing, McCloskey discovered herself as like other women,
a discovery that brings consonance between her mind and body, but requires
more conscious cultivation than is required of women born with female
bodies.
Now, consider the story of Max Wolf Valerio, a female-to-male transsexual (Treut et al. 1993). He tells a similar story to the one told by Deirdre
McCloskey in that his gender crossing is motivated by identity: "I always felt

LUCE I RIGARAY 'S N OT ION OF SEXUA L DI FFERENCE

123

like I was supposed to be a boy. Like I was a boy. Even though, I knew I
was not, but I felt I was somehow" (Treut et al. 1993, 98-99). He describes
being male as his iden tity: "My male gender identity was sort of the core
of my persona lity, of the core ingredients of who I am" (Treut et al. 1993 ,
98-99). Similar to McCloskey's insistence that sex crossing is not something
that people choose to do fo r utility or fo r gaining acceptance or financial
gain, Max describes trying to be a woman and to live as a lesbian. Ultimately, this attempt fai led. "Then one day it just happened. It was like an
explosion in my mind. W hen I realized that I wasn't really a lesbian, I was
a transsexual, and I was really a straigh t man" (Treut et al. 1993 , 98-99).
For Valerio, his life as a transsexual entails being treated as a man by others
and not simply know ing in his own mind that he is a man .
As McCloskey says, "Gender is not in every way natural" (McCloskey
1999, xv ). Gender is established by eras, societies, and individuals and .is
proj ected on bodies. In the cases of McCloskey and Valerio, though, simply
changing their own conceptions of what it means to be a man or a woman
did not satisfy the separation they felt between themselves and how other
men and women viewed them. Thus, it would seem that although one's body
is not enough to establish one's identity as male or female, it contributes
in significant ways, such that fo r some people who experience dissonance
between their sexual identity and their biological identity, it is rational to
cross from male to female or fe male to male.
The distinction between sexual identity and biological identity is a
fa miliar theme in l rigaray's work, as she distinguishes between anatomy and
morphology. As Whitford reminds us, morphology is the way in which bodies are culturally mediated (Whitfo rd 199 1, 107). That is, we begin with
some anatomical structures, but the interpretation of our anatomy is fi ltered
through culture. In the case of transsexuals, it is important for her or his
body to be recogn ized diffe rently from the anatomy with which she or he is
born. The descriptions that McCloskey and Valerio offer about gender crossing indicate that there is something important about one's gender identity
that confirms the arguments that I have been making. Sexual difference is a
process of cultivating nature. lrigaray's descriptions of cultivating the natural
require one to cultivate the body with which one is born. However, transsexual accounts of cultivating identity require changing their bodies, or the
way that others view their bodies, in order for others to recognize who they
are. For McCloskey and Valerio, crossing fro m male to female and female to
male allows them to have bodies that correspond to their self-understanding.
A lthough lrigaray herself would not cite these cases as instances of cultivating the natural, I believe that they are because McCloskey and Valerio do
not claim to be inventing their sexual identities; they are establishing sexual
identities that are already latently present.
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Jay Prosser's account of transsexuality in Second Skins highlights the
importance of establishing a correlation between one's embod iment as recognized by others and one's own body image. According to Prosser, prior to
sexual reassignment surgery, transsexuals feel that they arc trapped in the
wrong body (Pros~cr l998, 69). Sexual reassignment allows a transsexual
1
person 'to get the body back to what should have been" (83).
Whereas gender is not something that can be so lely determined by
culture, body, or biology, all of these things come together to help one
identify with and distinguish onese lf from others of the same gender and
another gender. For a transsexual person, this process of identification and
distinction can be aided by sex reassignment. Rather than restricting sexual
difference to women born women and men born men, sexual difference is a
concept that allows a flourishing of different experiences. As Stone states,
"a culture of ubiquitous and maximal sexual difference wou ld not restrict
individuality or autonomy, but show unprecedented permissiveness in the
ex tent to which it allowed and solicited individuals to realize themselves in
accordance with their natural drives" (Stone 2003, 73 ). lrigaray's readers,
Stone among them, emphasize the flourishing of difference that comes out
of the concept of sexual difference, a flourishing that can include transsexual
and transgender difference.
The difficulties that transsexuals face in defining their gender status are
the traces of the sex to which they were born. We can imagine a transsexual
person who has crossed to the other gender; she or he is indistinguishable
in her or his hormones, anatomy, vo ice, mannerisms, and self- understanding
from other women or men. However, the transsexual always has a past that
is not like other men and women. The transsexua l was born as the other
sex, can remember having the other sex's genitalia and hormones, and carries the memories of being treated as the other sex (Stone 1994, 5-10) .
Nevertheless, transsexual narratives underscore the importance of understanding sexual difference as between two. The transsexual person has not
been fooled by a cu ltural binary. If she or he were that easily swayed, then
she or he could simply accept the label that society assigns. A transman,
as Matt Kailey refers to himself, is not a woman who is tricking people
into thinking that she is a man; he is a man (Kailey 2005, 28 ). lrigaray's
articulation of sexual difference can help us to respect transsexuals and their
relationship to nature and culture.
If theorists of sexual difference insist that sexual d ifference is a strict
binary, then they cannot open a conversation with transgender peop le
whose experience does not fit into the binary between man and woman.
Whereas transsexual people are men or women (not both), transgender
people are men and women. According to Feinberg, "Transgender people
traverse, bridge, or blur the boundary of the gender expression they were
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assigned at birth" (Feinberg 1996, x, emphasis in original) . The way in
which transgender people traverse, bridge, or blur gender boundaries has
many manifestations. O ne might be born a fe male and appear masculine or
androgynous, or born a male and appear ~ minin or androgyn us. We can
consider two manifestations of transgender people by drawing on personal
descriptions from C. Jacob Hale and Leslie Feinberg.
For H ale, being transgender is what he chooses. Hale describes a time
in his life when as a w man, she engaged in a culture in which she could
become an adolescent boy (Hale 1997 ). The culture he describes allows fo r
a masculine identity that he argues is more real than sexual fa ntasy or mere
identification with the othe r sex, but less permanent than the complete
transformation of a fe male-to-male transsexual person.
According to Feinberg, being transgender is what happens in a society
with rigid sex/gender boundaries. Fe inberg attempts to define herself to a
reporter and says, "l am transgendered. I was born female, but my mascu line
gender expression is seen as male. It's not my sex that defines me, and it's
not my gender expression. It's the fac t that my gender expression appears
to be at odds with my sex. Do you understand? It's the social contradiction
between the two that defines me" (Feinberg 1996, 101) . In response, the
reporter asked Feinberg if she's a third sex, which only deepened Feinberg's
frustration. T h roughout the book Transgencler Warriors, Feinberg presents
historical ev idence of societies in which people who crossed gender lines
were accepted and celebrated, or vilified and persecuted. She creates a space
for the reader to understand that transgender people have always ex isted.
Feinberg's project creates a space fo r transgender people to locate their experience as like others' experience and creates a challenge to the idea that
sexual diffe rence can be underst od as a rigid binary. Hale and Feinberg
give evidence that sexual diffe rence can be fluid, can change , and is defined
within a cultural context.
To understand the significance of cultural context fo r transgendered
sexual difference, Judith H alberstam's statement about relationality can help ,
Transgender proves to be an important term not to people who want
to res ide outside of categories altogether but to people who want
to place themselves in the way of particular forms of recognition .
Transgender may indeed be considered a term of relationality; it
describes not simply an identity but a relation between people, within
a community, or within intimate bonds. (Halberstam 2005, 49)
"Transgender" is a term that helps place people in relation to people like
them and distinct from them, a project which is intimately linked to Irigaray's project of cultivating sexual difference. For lrigaray, cultivating sexual
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difference requires a positive space in which people with shared culture,
morphology, and genealogy can define and develop their experiences, but
sexual difference also requires a negative space where the one's identity
limits and is limited by the other's identity.
lrigaray's philosophy has been groundbreaking in challenging the idea
that sexual difference is rigid since being a woman r a man is defined by
nature, culture, bi logy, and psychology. She leads the way in trying to
think of sexual difference as at least two instead of as man and not-man.
Yet, her own work overemphasizes that sexual difference is merely two and
that the possibilities for cu ltivating one's sexual difference are inscribed at
birth. Consider "How Old Are You?" from]e, Tu, Nous, in which she writes,
The idea that I was born a woman but I must become the spirit
or soul of this body I am. I must open out my female body, give it
forms, words, knowledge of itself, a cosmic and social equilibrium,
in relation to the environment, to the different means of exchange
with others, and not only by artificial means that are inappropriate
to it. (Irigaray 1993 [1990], 116)
For lrigaray, the body with which one is born is definitive for developing
what one should become. I have argued, though, that when the body, mind,
and spirit tell different stories of who one is, then one's body can be cultivated to correspond to the mind and spirit. Transsexual and transgender
narratives reveal that the experience of sexual difference may change over
the course of a life or may include identification with man and woman,
masculine and feminine. These experiences provide a richness and complexity for sexual difference that an insistence on a binary difference established
at birth misses. To support the flourishing of difference illustrated by transsexual and transgender people, we can use the rich language, framework,
and methodology that lrigaray provides to discuss sexual difference, even as
we acknowledge that lrigaray resists this expansion of her work.
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